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avenue out of the debate may be to model food transfers as a sig-
naling problem rather than a resource holding potential (RHP)
problem. As Gurven mentions, RHP has not been measured for
any human population. Interactants attain knowledge of RHP
through signaling; hence we may be better off focusing our atten-
tion on the signals rather than on actual RHP. Common experi-
ences with fund-raising appeals underscore the importance of sig-
naling in understanding TS. We are likely to forgo some of our
wealth (which there is no debate that we control), not to those who
are necessarily the most in need, but to those solicitors who send
the most persistent signals and are able to impose the highest rep-
utational costs on us by signaling to others. Indeed, the most des-
titute individuals are often incapable of sending an influential sig-
nal that can motivate us to contribute to their cause because they
lack the resources to maintain our attention or impact our repu-
tation.
Gurven correctly notes that future work on food sharing will
need to examine the relationship between production, consump-
tion, and punishment. There are two types of tangible punish-
ments for slackers that occur on Ifaluk, which I add to the list of
punishments offered by Gurven. First, the distributor may bias
distributions away from those men who repeatedly do not fish. As
in many societies, larger harvests on Ifaluk are widely distributed
to all members of the community. However, when some men re-
peatedly failed to fish, the distributor gave these large harvests to
those compounds that owned the canoes that caught the fish; that
is, those who did not participate in the catch did not receive fish.
Second, a reputation as a slacker resulted in an inability to gener-
ate assistance in other cooperative tasks on Ifaluk. For example,
roofs are rethatched on Ifaluk huts about every two years. Prior to
a rethatching event, the chief announces that all adult males
should bring a certain number of woven coconut fronds (depen-
dent on the size of the house) for rethatching on a certain day. Men
who do not regularly contribute to cooperative fishing efforts have
difficulty getting men to contribute thatch or show up to rethatch
the roof. One notable shirker was forced to put a plastic tarp on
his roof because he was unable to get the help he needed. This
punishment highlights the need for research which looks com-
prehensively at foragers’ labor activities, because they may pro-
vide data on trade, reciprocity, and even punishment that could
explain otherwise puzzling sharing behavior.
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Abstract: Each of the food-sharing models that Gurven considers de-
mands unique cognitive capacities. Reciprocal altruism, in particular, re-
quires a suite of complex abilities not required by alternatives such as tol-
erated scrounging. Integrating cognitive constraints with comparative data
from other species can illuminate the adaptive benefits of food sharing in
humans.
Gurven argues that reciprocal altruism (RA) provides the best
adaptive account of human food sharing, explaining the patterns
better than tolerated scrounging (TS), kin selection, and costly sig-
naling. We contend that the emphasis on RA may be overstated,
whereas the analysis of TS is overly critical. To address the
overemphasis on RA, we make the following argument: First, a
more recent model of TS situations avoids the specific assump-
tions and predictions of previous models, providing a more gen-
erally applicable version of TS. Second, the presence of contin-
gency is not sufficient to invoke RA, because confounding factors
can produce reciprocal patterns. Third, using a comparative ap-
proach, we argue that RA rarely occurs in nonhuman animals,
probably because of the complex cognitive skills required to reci-
procate. Given these cognitive constraints, we examine the adap-
tive history of human food sharing originating from TS situations.
In total, these contentions suggest that, minimally, TS provides as
reasonable an explanation of the available data on human food
sharing as RA does.
Gurven adopts a strict definition of TS. Although the previous
optimality models of TS considered by Gurven require special cir-
cumstances and make overly specific predictions (Blurton Jones
1984; Winterhalder 1996a), a recent model of TS based on more
general assumptions does not predict egalitarian food sharing
(Stevens & Stephens 2002). This model predicts that if the beg-
gar’s harassment is costly enough to the owner, the owner may re-
linquish a fraction of the food to the beggar to avoid these costs.
The optimal amount shared depends on the costs of harassment
to the owner and to the beggar, as well as the consumption rate of
the consumers, so equal distribution of the food is unlikely. In con-
trast to the original TS formulation, in the Stevens and Stephens
model the food owners can control the distribution of the food and
the marginal value does not have to decrease. Therefore, many of
Gurven’s assumptions and predictions for the TS model do not ap-
ply to the more general harassment model.
In contrast to his strict view of TS, Gurven uses very relaxed 
criteria for RA. His crucial evidence for RA is the contingency of 
giving – individual A’s sharing with B correlates with B’s sharing 
with A. This type of analysis is necessary but not sufficient to assess
contingency because of potential confounding factors such as asso-
ciation. Rather than being contingent on previous instances, shar-
ing may result from associational relationships between individuals
(de Waal & Luttrell 1988); that is, individuals who interact fre-
quently for any reason, tend to demonstrate reciprocal sharing pat-
terns. Moreover, repeated, reciprocal TS interactions could lead to
patterns of sharing identical to RA. Therefore, examining long-term
patterns of contingency alone cannot provide the resolution to dis-
tinguish between RA and repeated TS interactions. Gurven is
clearly aware of these issues, but much of the available data does
not allow him to test between these alternative hypotheses.
The distinction between RA and TS is further complicated by
Gurven’s inclusion of punishment with RA. Theoretical investiga-
tions of reciprocal altruism suggest that punishment and social
norms may play a critical role in maintaining cooperative behav-
ior (Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis 2000). And indeed, Gurven’s survey
of the literature reveals that punishment and coercion regularly
occur in hunter-gatherer societies. As Gurven himself points out,
however, “the resulting ‘reciprocal’ TS . . . is essentially identical
to RA” (sect. 8.3, para. 1). In light of this convergence, how do we
distinguish between the two hypotheses?
Because the present view of human food sharing – one en-
forced by social norms and punishment – is equally compatible
with TS and RA models, we examine the probability that each
model accounts for the adaptive history of food sharing. Compar-
ative data suggest that the cognitive constraints on RA pose a sub-
stantial barrier to its evolution (Stevens & Hauser 2004), whereas
the considerably more relaxed constraints on TS make it a likely
candidate to explain present behaviors. In addition, empirical sup-
port for RA is virtually nonexistent in nonhuman animals (Ham-
merstein 2003). Even in the few cases that report RA, such as vam-
pire bats (Wilkinson 1984) and primates (Brosnan & de Waal
2002), it either is rare or requires special conditions (Hauser et al.
2003; Stephens et al. 2002). Evidence for TS and harassment,
however, is much more common among animals (Clutton-Brock
& Parker 1995; Stevens & Gilby 2004).
Why might reciprocity rarely occur and harassment commonly
occur in animals? An important difference between RA and TS is
the timescale over which the costs and benefits accrue. RA implies
that an individual pays an immediate cost to share and waits a pe-
riod of time before recouping that cost, presenting at least two
barriers to cooperation. First, animals (including humans) prefer
immediate over future benefits, and, therefore, devalue future re-
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wards. As Gurven points out, discounting has important conse-
quences in cooperative interactions (Rachlin 2002). Individuals
who highly discount future rewards may have difficulty employ-
ing reciprocal sharing strategies. Second, introducing a time delay
requires that individuals remember that they owe a debt or have
given a favor to another, and remember the amount of that debt
or favor. Memory decay and interference can make tracking debts
and favors difficult. The presence of a time delay allows for inter-
actions with multiple individuals, further increasing the cognitive
load by requiring simultaneous tracking of interactions with sev-
eral partners. For these reasons, the probability of sharing should
be inversely related to the expected reciprocation time.
TS strategies do not suffer from the same limitations because
the benefit to the harasser accrues immediately. Whereas RA de-
mands the evolution of a cognitively taxing strategy, harassment
demands the evolution of a relatively simpler strategy in which
selfish instincts result in immediate rewards. Implementing re-
peated TS strategies not only superficially resembles RA, but may
pave the way for RA by introducing a behavioral repertoire of en-
forced social norms on which stable RA strategies ultimately de-
pend (Blurton Jones 1984).
The argument from cognitive constraints is not designed to be
a knock-down punch, nor do we expect that any single model will
stand alone in the final rounds. Like Gurven, we suspect that ele-
ments of each of these models may be at play in the context of 
human food sharing. It would be a mistake, however, to broadly
construe the predictions of RA while narrowly confining the pre-
dictions of alternative hypotheses to a restricted set. Existing evi-
dence of food sharing is equally compatible with the harassment
model of TS, and the lower cognitive demands of harassment fa-
vor it as an adaptive hypothesis.
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Abstract: I agree with Gurven that costly signaling can explain food-shar-
ing phenomena. However, costly signaling may also explain the role of food
sharing in deterring rivals. Details of food-sharing interactions may reveal
gains and losses in the social prestige of the interacting parties. The evo-
lutionary models of kin selection and of reciprocal altruism are unstable
and should be avoided.
Gurven omits models of group selection (GS) from his discussion
of the adaptive significance of food sharing. He does so for a good
reason: not because the data do not fit models of GS, but because
of the general agreement among most sociobiologists that GS
models are vulnerable to social parasitism. Yet, Gurven considers
models of kin selection (KS) and of reciprocal altruism (RA) to ex-
plain the phenomena of food sharing. But KS and RA are just as
open to social parasites as is GS (Zahavi 1995). An individual in a
kin group may benefit from the investment of his other kin in the
kin group without investing in the good of his kin himself. This is
precisely the argument because of which GS was discarded as an
unstable model. The sharing of food between parents and their
offspring of all generations has nothing to do with KS models, be-
cause such sharing can be explained by the direct advantage to the
fitness of the parent through simple individual selection.
All forms of RA suffer from instability as well. Without en-
forcement, RA is open to social parasites. But enforcement of re-
ciprocation entails an investment on the part of those who enforce
reciprocation or discriminate against the social parasites. Why
should one bother to act as police or to impose a grudge if others
are already doing that? Thus, the very mechanism that ensures
reciprocation in RA models demands as much of an explanation
as the problem of altruism that RA was supposed to solve in the
first place.
Treating trade as a form of RA is mixing a simple utilitarian phe-
nomenon with altruism; the case of the trading of honey for def-
erence is a case of costly signaling (CS) rather than of RA.
The fact that food is often shared among kin is not necessarily
evidence that KS was the mechanism that selected it. Likewise,
reciprocal sharing of food is not necessarily evidence that it has
evolved because of the mechanism of RA.
Unlike KS and RA, which are both models of indirect selection,
tolerated scrounging (TS) is a simple, stable model based on indi-
vidual selection. Both the recipient and the donor gain: The re-
cipient gets the food and the donor saves the effort of defending
food that may not be defendable or is not worth defending. CS
models are also based on direct benefit to the donor and hence are
stable models (Zahavi 1995).
Food transfer (allofeeding) occurs also among birds. It often oc-
curs in courtship, but is also common among adults of the same
gender in several cooperatively breeding species such as the Ara-
bian babblers (Turdoides squamiceps), a bird species that I have
been studying for over 30 years. Food transfer between adults of
the same gender is almost without exception from a dominant to
a subordinate (Kalishov 1996). It may occur several times a day
throughout the year. The donor usually advertises the interaction
with special vocalizations, and the receiver often emits begging
calls. The food may be accepted submissively, accepted with im-
pudence, or rejected. Interestingly, the donor is sometimes ag-
gressive towards a subordinate that has rejected the food. Aggres-
sion occurs also in some of the rare cases in which a subordi-
nate offers food to a dominant. These aggressive interactions are
in line with Gurven’s models of CS, because if donating food ad-
vertises the donor’s claim for social status, then rejecting the offer
reduces the status of the donor. They cannot be accounted for by
the models of reciprocal altruism or kin selection (Zahavi & Za-
havi 1997).
The use of costly signaling models to explain altruism was de-
veloped from my suggestion (Zahavi 1977) that altruism serves as
a signal, and that the cost of the altruistic action is the investment
(the handicap) that supports the reliability of the signal. The sig-
nal may advertise the donor’s claim for prestige, or it may adver-
tise the motivation of the signaler to cooperate. However, it can
also function as a threat to potential rivals within the group. In a
cooperative social system, a collaborator may at any time turn into
a rival, seeking the right moment to replace the dominant. Adver-
tising the quality of the donor may convince a subordinate to ac-
cept the dominance of the donor and not attempt to rebel.
Gurven considers the cost of food transfer by the direct value
of the food transferred. I suggest that this is only a part of the cost.
Food transfer in babblers, as well as among humans, is often done
in times when food is abundant and its cost is trivial. An important
part of the cost in food sharing is the consequence of the interac-
tion itself. The donor displays its claim for social status (or social
prestige, as I prefer to call it); the recipient is expected to accept
and agree with this claim. If the receiver ignores the food, the so-
cial prestige of the donor is reduced (since there are usually other
witnesses to such interactions). On the other hand, receiving low-
ers the social prestige of the receiver. There is a lot of variation in
the way individual babblers accept or reject food donations under
varying social circumstances, and in the way the donations are pre-
sented. Also, in babblers such interactions are as important among
females as they are among males. Food sharing among humans
may reveal similar meaningful variations in the details of the in-
teractions and their cost in social prestige.
Social prestige is ever-present in social interactions. Like an in-
visible peacock’s tail, it is important in attracting collaborators and
deterring rivals.
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